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Chapter 2
Is it the Principal Principle that Implies
the Principle of Indifference?
Balázs Gyenis and Leszek Wron´ski
Abstract Hawthorne et al. (Br J Philos Sci, http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/lookup/
doi/10.1093/bjps/axv030) argue that the Principal Principle implies a version of the
Principle of Indifference. We show that what the Authors take to be the Principle
of Indifference can be obtained without invoking anything which would seem to
be related to the Principal Principle. In the Appendix we also discuss several
Conditions proposed in the same paper.
The argument of Hawthorne et al. (2015) (“Authors” from here on) that the Principal
Principle implies what they take to be the Principle of Indifference is based on their
Proposition 2, which (using their notation, and remembering that X “says that the
chance at time t of proposition A is x and E is any proposition that is compatible
with X and admissible at time t,” ibid.p. 1.1) can be restated as follows:
Proposition 2 Let P.AjX/ D P.AjXE/ D P.AjFXE/ D P.Aj.A $ F/XE/. Then
from x ¤ 0, x ¤ 1 and from the Principal Principle P.AjX/ D x it follows that
P.FjXE/ D 1=2.
Unfortunately it is unclear what the essence of Proposition 2 has to do with the
Principal Principle. One can easily show that its “indifference” message is simply
a consequence of imposing a sufficient number of independence constraints on an
arbitrary probability space:
1We note here that the Authors require also that F be “contingent and atomic”. From their
footnote 1 it is clear that by this they do not mean that F should be an atom of the considered
algebra of propositions, and rather that it should not be “logically complex”. We believe that
the mathematics of the current paper, and specifically the Counterexample in the Appendix is
acceptable from that point of view.
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Proposition 2’ Let P.AjX/ D P.AjXE/ D P.AjFXE/ D P.Aj.A $ F/XE/. Then
from P.AjX/ ¤ 0, P.AjX/ ¤ 1 it follows that P.FjXE/ D 1=2.
The proof is a straightforward calculation which does not make use of the Princi-
pal Principle. As it can be readily seen by comparing the Authors’ Proposition 2 with
Proposition 2’ the only tenuous connection between the Authors’ Proposition 2 and
the Principal Principle comes from that in order to conclude that P.FjEX/ D 1=2
one needs to rule out the extreme cases when P.AjX/ D 0 or P.AjX/ D 1; Propo-
sition 2 achieves this by setting x ¤ 0, x ¤ 1 and applying the Principal Principle,
but this is an overkill, since P.AjX/ ¤ 0, P.AjX/ ¤ 1 could be directly achieved by
simply requiring that learning event X does not make A impossible or certain.
Thus the Principal Principle does not have much to do with the essence of
Proposition 2. The Authors themselves also make a side-remark on p. 4. that
“interestingly, [their] line of argument does not depend on the structure of the
proposition X,” but they do not follow up on it and they do not seem to come to the
realization that the indifference message of Proposition 2 is a mere consequence of
the independence constraints: their Superprincipal Principle, with which the Authors
generalize the Principal Principle, also makes assumptions about the structure of
proposition X, and their generalized argument given subsequently still relies on
equating a conditional probability P.AjXE/ with a number x ¤ 0, x ¤ 1 to reach
the conclusion. Assuming that P.AjXE/ D x and x ¤ 0, x ¤ 1 is still an overkill to
merely ensure P.AjXE/ ¤ 0, P.AjXE/ ¤ 1, which as we can see in Proposition 2’ is
all that is needed to arrive at P.FjXE/ D 1=2. And thus the Superprincipal principle
does not have much to do with the essence of Proposition 2 either.
Notice that our claim is not simply that it is possible to obtain the Principle of
Indifference from something weaker than the Principal Principle: this would even
strengthen the original point the Authors wanted to make! We say rather that the
argument does not seem to have any connection to the Principal Principle, since
it is an inference from a set of independence assumptions to a conclusion about
independence, not relying on any statement regarding (credences about) chances.
The Authors devote some time to “defending” their Condition 2 which is
intended to furnish one of the premises of their Proposition 2. It can be restated
as follows:
Condition 2 If P.AjXE/ D P.AjX/, P.F/ D P.FjXE/, and the Principal Principle
P.AjX/ D x holds, then P.AjXE.A$ F// D P.AjX/.
The Authors state that Condition 2 “must hold because [it] encapsulate[s] core
intuitions about defeat” (p. 4.); however, one can show with a counterexample that
Condition 2 is not a theorem of probability theory. Instead of searching for ways to
“defend” Condition 2 it might be instructive to ask what additional supposition (S)
the Authors would need to add to the premises of Condition 2 to make it a theorem.
It is easy to find candidates for (S) that express probabilistic requirements in terms
of A;E;F;X (and possibly other events) without referring to the value x; however if
(S) took such form, then the same (S) could also be added to the premises of
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Condition 2’ If P.AjXE/ D P.AjX/, P.F/ D P.FjXE/ holds, then P.AjXE.A $
F// D P.AjX/
to make this latter a theorem. This is since if (S) does not refer to x, then the
additional assumption P.AjX/ D x, which is what differentiates Condition 2
from Condition 2’, will clearly not be used in the derivation. Thus if the Authors
succeed in finding and defending such an (S) with which Condition 2 furnishes
the desired premise of Proposition 2, then with the same (S) Condition 2’ also
furnishes the corresponding premise of Proposition 2’. Since neither Condition 2’
nor Proposition 2’ invokes the Principal Principle, we again would complete an
argument for what the Authors’ interpret as the Principle of Indifference without
invoking the Principal Principle. (For the mentioned counterexample, proof of
Proposition 2’, and additional comments on the Authors’ arguments regarding their
Conditions 1 and 2 the Reader is referred to the Appendix.)
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2’
Before the proof for later purposes we slightly reformulate Proposition 2’:
Proposition 2’ Let .LX;PX/ be a probability space, A;E;F 2 LX, and let PX.A/ D
PX.AjE/ D PX.AjFE/ D PX.Aj.A $ F/E/. Then from PX.A/ ¤ 0, PX.A/ ¤ 1 it
follows that PX.FjE/ D 1=2.
Proof Using the following identification for the probabilities for different conjunc-
tions:
o1 o2 o3 o4 o5 o6 o7 o8
PX.:/ p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7 p8
A x x x x
E x x x x
F x x x x
(so that AEF D o8, PX.AEF/ D p8 etc.) we can restate the conditions as
p8=.p4 C p8/ D p8=.p3 C p8/ (2.1)
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p8=.p4 C p8/ D p5 C p6 C p7 C p8 (2.2)
p8=.p3 C p8/ D .p7 C p8/=.p3 C p4 C p7 C p8/I (2.3)
we also require pi ! 0,P8iD1 pi D 1, and p3 C p4 C p7 C p8 > 0, p4 C p8 > 0,
p3 C p8 > 0 for the conditional probabilities to make sense.
By (2.1) we get that either p3 D p4 or p8 D 0. If p8 D 0 then from (2.2)
PX.A/ D p5 C p6 C p7 C p8 D 0 and all other conditions can be satisfied. If
p8 ¤ 0 then assuming p3 D p4 from (2.3) we get that either p7 D p8 or p4 D 0. If
p4 D 0 then from (2.2) PX.A/ D p5 C p6 C p7 C p8 D 1 and all other conditions
can be satisfied. Assuming p8 ¤ 0, p4 ¤ 0 and thus that p3 D p4 and p7 D p8,
PX.FjE/ D .p4 C p8/=.p3 C p4 C p7 C p8/ D .p4 C p8/=.2p4 C 2p8/ D 1=2 and
all other conditions can be satisfied. To sum up, either PX.A/ D 0, or PX.A/ D 1, or
PX.FjE/ D 1=2. QED
Remarks on Conditions 1 and 2 and a Counterexample
The premises of the Authors’ Proposition 2 are supposed to be furnished by the
following two Conditions:
“Condition 1. If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information that renders F relevant
to A, then EF is not a defeater.”
“Condition 2. If E is not a defeater and XE contains no information relevant to F, then
E.A$ F/ is not a defeater.” (ibid., p. 2)
which are, as mentioned earlier, to be understood in a context where X says that the
chance at time t of proposition A is x. The Authors call E a “non-defeater” (w.r.t. A)
if P.AjXE/ D P.AjX/ D x holds.
Unfortunately the Authors “take the supposition that XE contains no information
that renders F relevant to A to imply that P.AjFXE/ D P.AjXE/” (ibid., p. 2). In
other words, according to the Authors, if XE contains no information that renders
F relevant to A then XE screens off F from A. This is surely too strong. The most
natural mathematical counterpart of the Author’s natural language expression in
Condition 1 seems to be the one corresponding closely to “if F is not relevant to A
then XE does not make it relevant”, namely
P.AjF/ D P.A/! P.AjFXE/ D P.AjXE/: (2.4)
With that in place, Condition 1 becomes formally the following:
Condition 1 (reformulated) If P.AjXE/ D P.AjX/, P.AjF/ D P.A/ !
P.AjFXE/ D P.AjXE/, and the Principal Principle P.AjX/ D x holds, then
P.AjFXE/ D P.AjX/.
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Formula (2.4) is indeed weaker than the Authors’ screening off condition, as
evidenced by the following Counterexample (which—we claim—falsifies also the
original Conditions 1 and 2):
Counterexample 1 Let L be the Boolean algebra generated by the logically
independent propositions A;E;F,2 and X D “Ch.A/ D 2=5” and let P be the
probability on L that assigns 1=10 to the propositions :X:A:E:F, :X:AE:F,
X:A:E:F, X:AE:F, and assigns 1=20 to the rest of the algebraic atoms. .L;P/
then has the following properties:
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D P.AjXE.A$ F// ¤ P.AjX/ D 2
5
(2.10)
(i) Due to (2.5), (2.6), and (2.9) .L;P/ is a counterexample to
P.AjXE/ D P.AjX/ D x
P.AjF/ D P.A/! P.AjFXE/ D P.AjXE/
P.AjFXE/ D P.AjX/ D x;
that is, to the reformulated Condition 1 (see below)
2And so F can be assumed not to be “logically complex”, as the Authors wish.
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(ii) Due to (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8) .L;P/ is a counterexample to Condition 1.
(On the assumption that from the fact that due to (2.6) and (2.7) we see that
conditioning on XE leaves both the probability of A and the probability of F
intact we can infer that “XE contains no information that renders F relevant
to A”.)
(iii) Due to (2.5), (2.9), and (2.10) .L;P/ is a counterexample to Condition 2.
The interpretation of the propositions involved has to matter since the Authors
only provide a single intuition boosting example to illustrate the reasonableness of
Condition 1, and the plausibility of their illustration rests on a proper reading of
what it is for a characterization of a situation to not contain information that renders
two events relevant to each other. Apart from this sole example the Authors do
not provide any philosophical analysis of the plausibility of Condition 1, because
they claim, with their Proposition 1, that Condition 1 “provably holds.” However, it
holds only if “containing no information that renders F relevant to A” is expressed as
“screening off F from A”; our Counterexample also shows that it does not hold if we
follow the formulation of the condition more accurately, for example by using (2.4).
There are of course other formal candidates for “XE containing no information
that renders F relevant to A” which could be considered, of various logical strength.
One which perhaps could be promising is P.AjF/ " P.A/ D P.AjFXE/ " P.AjXE/.
However, if we use that in Condition 1, it agains falls prey to our Counterex-
ample 1—as evidenced by the clause (ii). The situation is similar with all other
candidates we have explored.
Since their Proposition 1 is no proof of Condition 1 as reconstructed above,
the Authors would need to provide a philosophical justification for it. But since
the justification for Condition 2 also depends on the availability of justification of
Condition 1—the Authors counter one of the main objections against Condition 2,
namely that it fails under a definition of admissibility put forward by Meacham
(2010), by claiming that that Meacham’s admissibility is too restrictive is evidenced
by the fact that it entails a violation of the supposedly provable Condition 1—the
premises of the main Proposition 2 stay insufficiently motivated, which then carries
over to whatever conclusion one can draw from it.
To wager philosophical bets on the potential success of justification of Con-
ditions 1 and 2 we remark that our Counterexample also evidences a probability
space in which both of these conditions fail. Universal quantification (or at least the
existence of a sound argument for typicality) over events and spaces matters since
the mere fact that some events in some probability spaces have a probability 1=2
would not establish a connection between the Principal Principle and the Principle
of Indifference.
We emphasize that our remarks regarding the appropriate formal reconstruction
of the Authors’ verbal formulation of Condition 1 are independent from the
argument developed in the main text.
As for some further remarks regarding Condition 2, we note that the flavor “under
some conditions, since we are ignorant of whether an independence constraint holds,
we assume that it does” it possesses is similar to “under some conditions, since we
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are ignorant of the probability, we assume that it is 1/2”—which is the Principle
of Indifference. This raises the suspicion that we are proving what we already put
in; indeed a requirement of probabilistic independence is of comparable strength as
narrowing down the probability to a single value, as we are now going to illustrate.
Thus let us consider now the Authors’ inference from P.FjXE/ D 1=2 to P.F/ D
1=2 right after their Proposition 2, which is the basis for their philosophical claim
that the Principle of Indifference should also hold for the unconditional prior. It
should be clear that this inference is only valid if Condition 2 indeed holds, but
the assumptions of their Proposition 2 can hold without Condition 2 being true (or,
alternatively, assumptions of Proposition 2’ can hold without Condition 2’ being
true). One can also quantify how frequently this is the case. Let us assume that
.LX;PX/ satisfies the conditions of our Proposition 2’ and hence PX.FjE/ D 1=2.
Using the terminology of the proof of Proposition 2’, let L be generated by adding
an additional algebraic atom o0 to LX , let A;E;F be the same as in the proof and let
X D fo1; : : : ; o8g; then with the probability P.Y/ D p0 # !Y.o0/C .1" p0/ # PX.YX/
the new .L;P/ also satisfies the conditions of Proposition 2’ and P.YjX/ D PX.Y/.
It is then easy to show that P.F/ D 1=2 only when p0 D 1"1=.2.p2Cp4Cp6Cp8//.
Thus even though in all of the so-defined extensions P.FjEX/ D 1=2, there is only
one in which P.F/ D 1=2 (and thus in which the independence constraint P.F/ D
P.FjXE/ holds) while in all of the uncountably many others P.F/ ¤ 1=2. Loosely
speaking it appears, then, that in this case we should expect Condition 2 to hold only
as frequently as we would expect P.F/ D 1=2 to hold if we set its value randomly.
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